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 ABSTRACT 
 
The present study, first, examines 153 Greek listed companies’ compliance with all IFRS 
mandatory disclosure requirements during 2005. Second, the present research complements and 
extends prior literature in the following way. The unique setting i.e., measuring compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements during the first year of IFRS implementation, allows for 
examination of the possibility that the change in the 2004 shareholders’ equity and net income, as a 
result of the adoption of IFRS, constitute explanatory factors for compliance. Thus, this study 
hypothesises that, in addition to the financial measures and other corporate characteristics that prior 
literature identifies as proxies for explaining compliance, a significant change in fundamental 
financial measures, because of the change in the accounting regime, may also explain compliance 
based on the premises of the relevant disclosure theories. The findings confirm these hypotheses. 
Third, this study makes a methodological contribution on measuring compliance with all IFRS 
mandatory disclosure requirements by using two different index methods (cf. Street and Gray, 
2001; Tsalavoutas et al., 2010) and pointing out the different conclusions may be drawn as a result. 
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1. Introduction 
     One of the main objectives of the IASB is to produce enforceable standards (IASCF Constitution, 
paragraph 2). This is stressed because it is well documented that companies do not comply with 
accounting standards’ mandatory disclosures (see section 2). This evidence is in line the argument that the 
existence of legislation and enforcing bodies does not guarantee compliance (Yeoh, 2005). Therefore, the 
possibility of uniform application of IFRS across different jurisdictions after 2005 has been heavily 
questioned (Ball, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Larson and Street, 2004; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Zeff, 2007; 
Weetman, 2006), arguing that the implementation of high quality standards [as IFRS claim to be] may not 
necessarily lead to high quality reporting. The present study addresses these concerns and contributes to 
the literature in the following three ways.  
     First, it examines 153 Greek listed companies’ compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosures 
during 2005. This sample represents approximately 48% of companies listed on Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE) at the end of March 2006, resulting in the study being one of the very few large scale single 
country academic studies which examine companies’ level of compliance with all IFRS mandatory 
disclosures after IFRS implementation in 2005 in EU countries.  
     Second, in line with prior studies, drawing on capital market based theories, agency theory, and cost 
based theories, this study tests several variables as proxies for the factors related to the compliance 
identified. These determinants include size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, industry and audit firm size. 
However, beyond this, the present research complements and extends prior literature in the following 
way. The unique setting, i.e. measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures during the first year 
of IFRS implementation, allows also for examination of the possibility that the change in the 2004 
shareholders’ equity and net income, as a result of the adoption of IFRS, constitute also explanatory 
factors for compliance. Thus, this study hypothesises that inter alia not only financial measures can be 
proxies for explaining compliance as derived by relevant theories. In addition, a significant change in 
fundamental financial measures, because of the change in the accounting regime, may also explain 
compliance based on the premises of the relevant disclosure theories. The rationale behind these tests is 
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the following. Considering the implications deriving from the assumptions of agency and signalling 
theory, managers would have strong incentives  to assess the “compliance risk” (cf. Adams, 1994), i.e. to 
assess trade-off between agency costs or signalling effects and the impact on their companies’ financial 
positions as this caused by the transition to IFRS. 
     Third, the review of the pertinent literature to the present study indicates that the majority of prior 
studies examining compliance with national accounting standards’ or IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures 
apply only one disclosure index method. However, the findings of Street and Gray (2001) and 
Tsalavoutas et al. (2010) indicate that the findings of similar studies may be substantially biased because 
of the method employed for measuring compliance. On that basis, this study uses the two most commonly 
used disclosure index methods (Cooke’s method and the PC Method – see section 3 for more details) and 
tests the significance of the differences in the compliance scores identified. Additionally, it explores the 
implications of the application of both methods with regard to determinants of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. In contrast to Street and Gray (2001), this study considers as valid findings only 
the compliance determinants being significant under both methods.  
     Greece offers a suitable as well as an interesting setting because of its distinctive financial reporting 
environment. The accounting/audit profession is relatively young (Baralexis, 2004) and enforcement of 
accounting regulation is very weak (La Porta et al., 1998; Baralexis, 2004). Hence, it is highly probable 
that this background would allow for large differences of compliance levels across listed companies 
compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. Additionally, ASE is regarded as a developed market since 2000 
(Mantikidis, 2000; FTSE, 2009) and almost 50% of the market capitalisation belonged to foreign 
investors at the end of March 2006 (Central Security Depository, 2006). Thus, there is not only national, 
but also international interest in the quality of Greek listed companies’ financial statements.  
     The findings can be summarised as follows. The average level of compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures approximates to 80% (depending on the disclosure index method employed). In fact, the 
scores calculated under the PC method are significantly lower from those calculated under Cooke’s 
dichotomous approach. The change on net income and shareholders’ equity, as a result of the transition to 
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IFRS, as well as audit firm size, are significantly associated with the extent to which companies comply. 
These findings are interpreted based on the particular characteristics of the Greek context and the 
premises of signalling, agency and political costs theories. However, similar to Street and Gray’s (2001) 
study, not all factors appearing to explain compliance scores under the PC Method are the same as those 
appearing significant under Cooke’s dichotomous approach. More specifically, industry classification 
appears to be a significant explanatory factor of compliance under the PC Method but not under Cooke’s 
method. 
     The compliance levels identified and the determinants significantly correlated with them are expected 
to be of particular interest to regulators and standard setters as well as to academics who may wish to 
conduct similar studies. This is not only because of the relatively low compliance levels identified but 
also because it is shown that the adjustments reported in the reconciliation statements on transition to 
IFRS relate to companies’ “compliance behaviour” (cf. Jenkinson, 1996; Adams, 1994), with regard to 
mandatory disclosures at least.  
     Additionally, with reference to the methods employed, these findings should alert researchers who 
plan to use these methods to the implications of their own findings and the care that needs to be taken in 
their interpretation. They also raise an opportunity for further research by questioning the validity of the 
findings of prior research which applied only one of the two methods. Finally, these results should also 
alert practitioners who read academic studies the results of which are based only one disclosure index 
method.  
     The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the findings of the prior 
relevant literature. Drawing on the relevant disclosure theories, the research hypotheses are also 
developed in this section. Section 3 describes the data employed and the research design. Section 4 
provides the results and discussion of empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Literature review and development of hypotheses   
2.1 Compliance with national standards’ mandatory disclosures 
     Table 1 provides a summary of the reviewed disclosure studies that examined compliance with 
national standards and regulations. These studies are classified according to the chronological order of the 
financial year examined (i.e. not year of publication).  
 
 
TABLE 1 - ABOUT HERE 
 
 
From the 16 studies identified, four examine companies’ compliance during the late 1980s, 11 during the 
1990s and only one study examines compliance after 2000. In contrast to the present study, none of those 
is focused on a developed country, based on a recent sample. Additionally, with the exception of Ali et al. 
(2004) which is a multi-country study and Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) who examine a sample of 50 
companies over a four year period, the remaining studies use significantly smaller samples than the 
present study. Only the study of Craig and Diga (1998) employs a sample of a similar size (145 
companies) although it is a multi-country study.  
     Furthermore, 14 out of the 16 studies employ only one disclosure index method (the commonly used 
dichotomous approach, see section 3). Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) employ the commonly used 
dichotomous approach and a weighted index based on the mean and median responses of seven users of 
financial statements in the country which the study focuses (i.e. Saudi Arabia). Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
follow the commonly used dichotomous approach with two more alternatives, a “somewhat broader” and 
a “broad” index (Patton and Zelenka, 1997: 609).  
     It is acknowledged that the studies reviewed focus on companies operating in significantly different 
institutional settings (including enforcement) and thus caution is needed when one tries to compare their 
findings and draw conclusions. In fact, Craig and Diga (1998) identify significantly different compliance 
levels across countries in the ASEAN region. Additionally, the samples refer to different periods, and all 
studies employ self-constructed indices1 which may increase subjectivity of the scoring process.2  
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     Nevertheless, it is notable, that these studies reach similar conclusions. It is common that companies 
do not comply fully with national accounting standards’ disclosure requirements. In particular, 
compliance levels are very rarely close to or even higher than 90%, with the majority of studies reporting 
average compliance levels of approximately 70% to 80%. Great variability in the compliance scores is 
also documented.  
     With reference to Greece, there is only one study (Vlachos, 2001) which examines listed companies’ 
compliance with the disclosure items mandated by the Greek GAAP.3 The sample consists of 74 
companies’ financial statements with reference to the year 1996. He finds an average compliance level of 
89% with a small standard deviation of 2.3%.  
     However, it is noted that the findings of this study have to be treated with caution because they may be 
biased towards companies that provided high levels of disclosures. At that time, very few companies 
provided in public notes to the financial statements thus, those that provided an annual report might have 
been “committed” to higher disclosure levels. Another feature of Vlachos’ (2001) research is that:  
…the study also captures an element of voluntary disclosure (as in the case of Wallace 
et al., 1994 and Wallace and Naser, 1995). This is because the information items 
required to be disclosed (mandatory information) have been disaggregated into sub-
elements of information that should or could have been disclosed; usually the disclosure 
of those sub—elements of information is essentially a matter of managerial choice 
(Barrett, 1976) (Vlachos, 2001: 9) 
Finally, at that period, ASE was an emerging market which implies that financial statements were of less 
importance compared to the period under investigation (2005) when ASE is considered to be a developed 
market (Mandikidis, 2000; FTSE, 2009). 
 
2.2 Compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures 
Table 2 provides a summary of the reviewed disclosure studies examining compliance with IFRS 
(referred to as IAS before 2001).  
 
TABLE 2 - ABOUT HERE 
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The levels of compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures shown in Table 2 look very similar to 
those regarding disclosures mandated by other national standards, as illustrated in Table 1. It is common 
that companies do not comply fully with IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements and low compliance levels 
are not rare. A great variability in the compliance scores is also documented.4  
     In line with Craig and Diga (1998), Tower et al. (1999), Street and Gray (2001) and Al-Shammari et 
al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that this depends on the companies’ country of domicile, i.e. 
compliance levels depend on the particular financial reporting system of each country. This further 
supports the argument that adoption of IAS/IFRS would not necessarily lead to higher provision of 
mandatory disclosures.  
     Another feature of the studies reviewed is that their samples refer, mainly, to the late 1990s and early 
2000s. With the exception being the working paper of Fekete et al. (2008), none of the academic studies 
examines compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures after their implementation in the EU in 2005. 
Even those studies that include companies from the early 2000s examine compliance with older versions 
of IAS, i.e. not the revised IAS and newly introduced IFRS which were intended to provide a “stable 
platform” regarding the first years of IFRS mandatory implementation in the EU. Fekete et al. (2008) 
focus on compliance with the requirements of four standards (IFRS 3, IAS 27, IAS 28 and IAS 31) and 
the sample consists only of 17 Hungarian companies.  
     The two surveys of SEC and of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) provide also some preliminary evidence regarding EU companies’ levels of compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures after 2005. However, their findings are mainly descriptive in nature. Thus, 
the SEC reported that they “have not yet reached any comprehensive conclusions about companies' 
overall compliance with, or consistency in application of, IFRS”.5 
     A further finding of this review is that Al-Shiab (2003) reports low average compliance scores 
compared to other studies examining compliance with IAS disclosure requirements in emerging markets 
in a similar period (e.g. Hassan et al. (2006) with regard to Egypt). More specifically, companies’ level of 
compliance ranged from 45% to 56%. Although this may depend on the specific characteristics of the 
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financial reporting system in Jordan, it is also attributable to the different method used for measuring 
compliance. This tends to produce more “conservative” (i.e. lower) compliance scores (Tsalavoutas et al., 
2010).  
     Additionally, similar to the studies discussed in the previous sub-section, the majority of studies 
employ only one disclosure index method for measuring compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory 
disclosures (the commonly used dichotomous approach). Street and Gray (2001) use both this method and 
the one that Al-Shiab uses but do not test the significance of the differences in the compliance scores 
identified. It is worth mentioning that they find different significant associations under each method 
between the dependent variable (compliance score) and a number of independent variables.6  
     Finally, there is very little evidence regarding Greek listed companies’ compliance with IAS/IFRS. In 
particular, only Cairns (2001) includes financial statements of Greek listed companies (three) which 
claimed that they had adopted IFRS in addition to Greek GAAP.7 He reports that only one of the three 
companies provided full IFRS consolidated financial statements. The other two did not provide cash flow 
statements and accounting notes. 
     The consistent findings of low compliance with IFRS or other national accounting standards’ 
mandatory disclosures allow for the conclusion that, although companies are expected to comply with the 
mandated disclosures, they rarely do so in full. Therefore, these findings provide solid grounds for the 
concerns regarding the “quality” of financial statements after the adoption of IFRS in the EU (e.g. Nobes, 
2006; Weetman, 2006; Ball, 2006; Schipper, 2005). With regard to the present study, they suggest that 
compliance levels with IFRS mandatory disclosures may also be low for Greek listed companies.  
     From a methodological point of view, the present study also claims more robust findings compared to 
those provided by prior studies. In particular, the present research employs two methods for measuring 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures and tests the significance of the differences in the 
compliance scores identified. As a consequence, this study considers as valid findings only the 
determinants of compliance being significant under both methods.  
     Finally, these reviews also illustrate that there is no recent large scale academic study exploring 
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companies’ compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosures after 2005 (or other national standards’ 
mandatory disclosures in general). The present study addresses this gap in the literature and contributes to 
the recent calls for this type of research.  
 
2.3 Development of hypotheses 
     Prior studies have suggested and tested several variables as explanatory factors for compliance with 
mandatory disclosures. This approach perceives disclosures as an endogenous choice that is related to 
companies’ fundamentals or other characteristics. In accordance with Camfferman and Cooke (2002), 
with reference to Lang and Lundholm, (1993), these are classified as: structure-related; performance-
related; and market-related variables.  
     The category of structure-related variables includes characteristics that usually are stable over time. 
Consistent with prior literature, the two considered here are size and gearing (e.g. Al-Shiab, 2003; Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, 2003, Ali et al., 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Shammari et al., 2008). However, 
based on the mixed findings of the prior literature, although an association between these two variables 
and companies’ levels of compliance is hypothesised, no prediction regarding the sign of the relationships 
is attempted. 
     Further, a company’s performance is sensitive to time conditions. Hence, management holds 
information that should be transmitted to investors in order to reduce information asymmetries regarding 
companies’ performance within the period (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In that context, the performance-
related variables which can be proxies for performance are liquidity and profitability (Street and Gray, 
2001; Al-Shiab, 2003; Glaum and Street, 2003; Ali et al., 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005). However, 
profitability shares a similar limitation with size. The direction of its relationship with companies’ levels 
of disclosures cannot be hypothesised. This is justified by the inconclusive findings of prior research. 
     Finally, market-related variables have been argued to be relatively stable over time and more within 
companies’ control. The present study employs two market-related variables: audit firm size and industry 
type (cf. Patton and Zelenka 1997; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and 
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Weetman, 2003). Although the direction of the relationship between industries type with companies’ 
levels of disclosures cannot be hypothesised, a positive relationship between companies’ extent of 
disclosures and audit firm size is hypothesised. The latter is based on the consistent evidence found in the 
prior literature. 
     However, as argued above, the present research complements and extends prior literature by testing 
two further variables which could fall under the structure- and performance related categories of 
variables, respectively. More specifically, the unique setting, i.e. measuring compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures during the first year of implementation, allows also for examination of the 
possibility that the change in the 2004 shareholders’ equity and net income, as a result of the adoption of 
IFRS, constitute also explanatory factors for compliance. Thus, this study hypothesises that the behaviour 
of managers regarding the amount of overall disclosures provided may be influenced by the impact of 
IFRS on company key measures, as this can be assessed through the reconciliation statements and the 
2004 restated comparative figures.  
     Research has indicated that information reported in reconciliation statements is perceived as 
meaningful by investors (e.g. Christensen et al., 2010), who are considered to be among the main users of 
financial statements by the IFRS Framework. Therefore, the present study examines the extent of 
companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosures for the 2005 financial period. Within the notes 
accompanied the 2005 financial statements, the impact caused on shareholders’ equity and net income for 
2004, as a result of the transition to IFRS, became known to the users of the financial statements.  
     The Greek context is particularly relevant because there is evidence that Greek companies’ financial 
statements were affected significantly by the transition to IFRS, as a result of the significant differences 
between IFRS and Greek GAAP (Grant Thornton, 2006; HCMC, 2006; Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010). 
This evidence suggests that a structural change in the financial position of Greek companies took place on 
transition to IFRS. Shareholders’ equity, and in turn gearing and liquidity, were affected significantly. 
Thus, the present research also considers, as a third structure-related variable, the impact on 2004 
shareholders’ equity as a result of the transition to IFRS. It also considers as a third performance-related 
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variable, the impact on 2004 net income as a result of the transition to IFRS. The rationale for this 
investigation in further discussed below. 
     On transition to IFRS, several intangible assets were derecognised, treasury shares were derecognised, 
whilst inventories and other assets were impaired. Additionally, deferred tax assets were recognised and 
land and buildings were revalued. Furthermore, liabilities increased, as a result of the recognition of 
pension related and other provisions for example. Hence, companies’ shareholders’ equity (and thus size 
and gearing) would be affected considerably. (See Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010 for supporting evidence 
on these issues). This has particular relevance for the present study as the assumption that a company’s 
structure, as this expressed in the balance sheet, may stay stable over time may not be valid when 
companies moved to IFRS.  
     This becomes more important when one considers the findings of prior literature indicating that 
companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures are associated with shareholders’ equity 
(e.g. Tai et al., 1990). Thus, a significant change in that measure, as a result of the introduction of IFRS 
could have profound implications on managers’ “compliance behaviour”, with reference to mandatory 
disclosures. This change was easily observable to users of the financial statements by looking at the 
reconciliation statements. There was no need for a user to have the previous year’s financial statements to 
compute the impact on the difference between the two measures. On that basis, managers of Greek 
companies may be very sensitive to how users of the financial statements would interpret a large 
difference in the two figures. Considering the implications deriving from the assumptions of agency and 
signalling theory, managers would have strong incentives  to assess the “compliance risk” (cf. Adams, 
1994), i.e. to asses trade-off between agency costs or signalling effects and the impact on their 
companies’ financial positions as this caused by the transition to IFRS  
     Companies which faced a significant positive adjustment could provide higher levels of mandatory 
disclosures, in accordance with signalling theory. It is highly probable that managers would try to 
“exploit” this positive change by arguing that their companies’ financial position was not reflected 
accurately in the past because of the low quality of Greek GAAP. Thus, a positive relationship between 
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the impact on shareholders’ equity (as a result of the transition to IFRS) and companies’ compliance with 
mandatory disclosures may be identified.  
     In contrast, under agency theory, managers may well be under pressure to “communicate” why such 
an improvement on companies’ financial position arises, to pre-empt allegations of a significant change 
being due to fraudulent accounting practices. Additionally, companies with a significant negative impact 
will be under more pressure to explain why companies’ financial position appears to be worse under the 
higher quality accounting standards (i.e. IFRS) which are believed to reflect companies’ assets and 
liabilities more accurately. Thus, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) - There is an association between changes in shareholders’ equity (as a result of the 
transition to IFRS) and the extent to which companies comply with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. 
 
 
As far as the hypothesis regarding the impact on 2004 net income is concerned, the rationale is the 
following. One major problem of the relationships between managers and shareholders is the fact that 
what investors may perceive as an optimal level of performance may differ from what is perceived by 
managers. In fact, managers may be in favour of a satisfactory but not an optimal level (Smith, 1976; 
Leventis, 2001).  
     In the Greek environment, where findings of earnings management have been consistently reported 
(Leuz et al., 2003; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008), the difference between management and shareholders 
on what is perceived to be optimal levels of performance might be more distinct. The introduction of 
IFRS was expected to cause a significant impact on companies’ restated absolute values of net income 
regarding 2004 indicating curtailment of the creative accounting practices followed under Greek GAAP. 
The impact identified across a large number of companies by HCMC (2006), Grant Thornton (2006) and 
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010) confirms this expectation.  
     A significant difference in the restated figure might have a profound effect on managers’ rational 
decision with regard to the extent to which they would comply with IFRS mandatory disclosures. A 
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significant positive change would allow them to claim that previous year’s performance was low, not 
because of their inefficiency but because Greek GAAP was of poor quality, i.e. it produces conservative 
reported performance. Thus, in line with signalling theory, high provision of mandatory disclosures 
would be expected. This would encourage them to provide as much information as possible to claim that 
the company was performing well but the accounting rules did not allow for this to be reflected on the 
financial statements.  
     Drawing on agency theory, such an approach would be used to provide convincing information to the 
users of the financial statements that low profitability was not a result of creative accounting practices. 
However, also within the framework of agency theory, reporting substantially improved restated income 
values may trigger the suspicion of shareholders under the rationale that this improvement is a result of a 
“transitional big bath”. Hence, again, more disclosures might be provided but not necessarily with the 
intention to signal better performance. This would also facilitate the minimisation of agency costs. In 
contrast, a significantly negative restated performance would raise concerns of shareholders. This would 
imply that the performance last year was actually worse than had been reported originally and thus 
management would have to explain, through the provision of increased disclosures, why this was the 
case. Further, it has been argued that companies with excessive profits may attract government’s attention 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Deegan and Unerman, 2008). Thus, firms of which the restated profit 
levels were affected substantially would consider the political costs that may derive from such a change. 
Accordingly, this might have affected their “compliance behaviour” (cf. Jenkinson, 1996) in 2005.  
     Therefore, it is hypothesised that companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures is 
associated with the impact caused on the restated net income values regarding 2004. On that basis, the 
following hypothesis is formed: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) - There is an association between changes in net income (as a result of the transition to 
IFRS) and the extent to which companies comply with IFRS mandatory disclosures.  
 
 
 
15 
 
3 Data and research design   
3.1 Data  
     There were 317 companies listed on the ASE at the end of March 2006. The sample excludes five 
early IFRS adopters and 44 financial companies. Additionally, 11 companies with 30 June as their year 
end date are excluded. (Companies with a later reporting date may have ‘learned’ from the disclosures 
provided by companies reporting earlier. Hence, to avoid bias these companies were excluded.) 
Furthermore, six companies which changed auditors between 2004 and 2005 were excluded. (As 
discussed above audit firm size is supposed to stay stable over time.) 56 further companies had to be 
excluded because of data unavailability. This leaves a sample of 195 firms.  
     However, from those companies, 42 provided inadequate reconciliation disclosures. They either did 
not provide the reconciliation statements required or provided insufficient disclosures to allow for an 
evaluation of the impact caused by the implementation of individual IFRS. Accordingly, they were 
excluded because omission of this information would not allow for examination of the hypotheses tested. 
This leaves a final sample of 153 companies. The market values were acquired from ASE in electronic 
format. The line items from the 2005 financial statements were hand collected. 
 
3.2 Measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements  
     As discussed above, one of the main contributions of this study is that it reports more robust findings 
as far as the compliance scores measured and the corporate characteristics associated with the levels of 
compliance identified. This is because two methods for measuring compliance have been employed 
simultaneously. These are the following. The unweighted disclosure index where compliance is 
calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed to the maximum possible score applicable for that 
company. This the most common approach for determining compliance with disclosure requirements by a 
company (e.g. Hodgdon et al., 2008; Ali et al., 2004; Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003; Street and Gray, 2001; Street and Bryant, 2000; Craig and Diga, 1998; Patton and 
Zelenka; 1997; Cooke, 1996; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994). This study refers to this 
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method as “Cooke’s dichotomous approach”. (Aljifri (2008) also refers to this method by using the same 
term.)  
     However, this kind of disclosure index has an important limitation: the number of disclosure items 
required by different standards varies considerably. Some standards require a large number of items to be 
disclosed (e.g. IAS 1 ‘Presentation of financial statements) while some others require only a few (e.g. IAS 
2 ‘Inventories’). This may become a significant problem when studies examine compliance with IFRS (or 
other sets of standards’) mandatory disclosures. As a result, “…standards which require more items to be 
disclosed or, in other words, standards with more items included in the index are unintentionally and 
indirectly not treated equally with those that require fewer items to be disclosed” (Al-Shiab, 2003: 222).  
     An alternative method that avoids this problem is the “Partial Compliance (PC) unweighted approach” 
(hereafter PC method) employed by Street and Gray (2001),8 Al-Shiab (2003, 2008) and Tsalavoutas et 
al. (2010). According to this approach, “the degree of compliance for each company is measured by 
adding the degree of compliance for each standard and then dividing this sum by the number of standards 
applicable to each company” (Al-Shiab 2003: 223).  
     Street and Gray (2001) use both methods but do not test the significance of the differences in the 
compliance scores identified. Interestingly, they find different significant associations under each method 
between the dependent variable (compliance score) and a number of independent variables. This study 
uses both methods and like Tsalavoutas et al. (2010) tests the significance of the differences in the 
compliance scores identified. However, it extends prior literature by exploring the implications of the 
application of both methods with regard to the factors appearing to explain compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. Only the compliance determinants that appear to be significant under both 
methods are considered as valid findings  
     Initially, a scoring sheet which included 509 items required to be disclosed by IFRS extant at the end 
of April 2006 (excluding six standards9) was constructed.10 Then, to ensure the content validity of the 
initial research instrument,11 it was reviewed independently by other two researchers. After receiving their 
comments and suggestions, any remaining ambiguities were discussed with a fourth experienced 
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academic.12 The final disclosure checklist included 481 mandatory items, required by 31 standards, as 
extant in April 2006. Table 3 shows the number of items identified by each researcher, and the final 
index.  
 
TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The differences in the number of items initially identified by the author and the independent researchers 
for some standards (e.g. IAS 8, 14 and 38) illustrates the need for carrying out this verification process. 
These differences arose because (i) the same disclosure items were required by multiple standards (i.e. 
duplication), (but should only be included once), and (ii) different judgement relating to the level of 
disaggregation (see above). 
     To ensure the reliability of the research instrument,13 the author and the two independent researchers 
scored 10 randomly selected companies. Then the findings of the three researchers were compared. Given 
that the final research instrument had been agreed by all investigators, differences in the compliance 
scores across the investigators were not significant.14  
 
Measurement of variables 
There is a wide variation among prior studies on the surrogates selected for corporate characteristics that 
may be related to compliance with companies’ disclosures.15 This variation mainly depends on the data 
being available and may be also a reason for the mixed findings in the prior literature regarding the 
corporate characteristics related to companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures. Table 4 
illustrates, what measures have been used in the present study with regard to the three groups of variables 
under examination.  
 
TABLE 4 – ABOUT HERE 
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Table 5 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the surrogates employed. It is noted that the 
square root of the independent variables is utilised in this study as a transformation method for the 
independent variables that are not normally distributed (cf. Pallant, 2005; Fielding and Gilbert, 2004). 
 
 
TABLE 5 – ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010), the descriptive statistics in Table 5 
indicate that companies’ shareholders’ equity was significantly affected on transition to IFRS. In fact, for 
the companies used in this study, shareholders’ equity under Greek GAAP was, on average, materially 
higher (11%) than the restated figure under IFRS. However, more companies faced a positive impact on 
transition to IFRS with regard to this measure (median being 0.99). This indicates that there are several 
companies where the negative impact is material which drives the average score (of the index) upwards. 
In fact, an analysis of the frequencies of this variable (not tabulated) indicates that, out of the 74 facing a 
negative impact, only 26 companies faced a non-material change. The remaining 48 faced a change of 
more than 10%. Accordingly, companies’ “financial structure” (i.e. the proportion of shareholders’ equity 
to other balance sheet items) changed significantly.  
     Table 5 also illustrates that the majority of companies in the sample (85) faced a negative change in 
the 2004 net profit as reported under Greek GAAP and the corresponding restated figure under IFRS. 
Additionally, it illustrates that, on average, net income was 29% higher under Greek GAAP compared to 
the restated figure under IFRS, suggesting that a large number of companies faced a material negative 
change in this measure. In fact, an analysis of the frequencies of this variable (not tabulated) indicates 
that, out of the 85 facing a negative impact, only 20 companies faced a non-material change. The 
remaining 65 faced a change of more than 10%. 
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Multivariate analyses - Transformation of the dependent variable 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most commonly used technique in disclosure studies (Leventis, 
2001) where the dependent variable is the compliance/disclosure score and the independent variables 
include the factors discussed above. Hence, this approach is also followed here.  
     However, using a ratio in a regression model may result in the model producing prediction of 
probabilities greater than one (Al-Shiab, 2003). This problem may arise because the dependent variable is 
bounded (i.e. lies between 1 and 0) (Cooke, 1998). Additionally, the compliance score may not be 
normally distributed and thus the major assumption of the classical OLS regression, i.e. that the 
dependent variable is normally distributed, is violated.  
     To mitigate this problem, it is common, researchers to employ transformations of the dependent 
variables in disclosure studies. This is in line with Cooke (1998: 211) who explains that in these types of 
studies “the dependent variable is a metric ratio and therefore can be legitimately transformed, where 
necessary, and used in regression analysis”.  
     Cooke (1998) compares and contrasts some of these methods by employing them in two case studies 
so as to explore the implications for research in disclosure studies. For one case study the log of the odds 
ratio of the dependent variable provided the best fit, whereas for the second case study the rank data 
provided the best fit. Thus he concludes that the “success” of each method depends on the structure of the 
data (ibid: 223) and that “no one procedure is best but that multiple approaches are helpful to ensure the 
results are robust across methods” (Cooke, 1998: 209).  
     Following this proposition, the present research employs two regressions to control for problems that 
may rise because of the data structure. It follows prior studies which have transformed the dependent 
variable to percentiles ranks (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006)16 and also those that have 
employed the log of the odds ratio (e.g. Al-Shammari et al. 2008; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Al-Shiab, 
2003; Inchausti, 1997).17  
The log of the odds ratio is computed as follows:  
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Y =log (
p
p
−1
)     (Eq. 1) 
where Y = the transformed level of compliance and p = the ratio of companies’ compliance computed 
with the disclosure methods explained above. These two techniques are applied with regard to both 
methods for measuring compliance employed here (i.e. the PC method and Cooke’s dichotomous 
approach). It is acknowledged that although this transformation surpasses the problem of having a 
bounded dependent variable it is not always able to correct for kurtosis and skewness (Cooke, 1998). 
Percentile ranks are computed in the following way: 
(Rank-1) / (Sample size – 1)    (Eq. 2) 
This yields the percentile of a firm’s rank within the sample where percentiles range from 0 (for the 
lowest ranking firm) to 1 (for the highest-ranking firm). In line with Botosan and Plumlee (2002), 
companies are ranked in ascending order, so that companies with higher level of compliance receive 
higher rank. Rank transformations have the advantage to be distribution free (McCabe, 1989) and they 
correct for kurtosis and skewness; they “are also relatively insensitive to outliers”. (Cooke, 1998: 212). 
On that basis, the following OLS regression model is employed:  
jjj
jjjjjjj
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ε++
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                  (Eq. 3) 
where CSj is the transformed compliance score, measured either with the PC method or Cooke’s method; 
SIZEj is the square root of market value; GEAj is the square root of total debt to total assets in 2005; 
EQUCOIj is the square root of the difference between shareholders’ equity in 2004 under Greek GAAP 
and the restated figure under IFRS, measured by Gray’s comparability index; ROSj is the square root of 
pre-tax profit on sales in 2005; EARCOIj is the square root of the difference between net income in 2004, 
under Greek GAAP, and the restated figure under IFRS, measured by Gray’s comparability index; LIQj is 
the square root of current assets to current liabilities in 2005; AUDj is a dummy variable where 1 
represents companies with a “Big 4” auditor and 0 otherwise and INDj is a dummy variable where 1 
represents manufacturing companies and 0 otherwise; and εj is the mean zero disturbance term. 
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Interpreting the results of the multivariate analyses 
Consistent with Cooke (1998), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Leventis and Weetman (2004) 
perceive the minimisation of the MSE as the best criterion for selecting a model in disclosure studies. In 
line with these studies, herein, the interpretation of the findings of the multivariate analyses is primarily 
based on the significance of the independent variables as these are reported in the regression with the 
lowest MSE. Thus, when the MSE of a regression is substantially higher than the others, such a 
regression is not considered providing a good fit for the data.  
     However, Cooke (1998: 215) argues that “in most disclosure studies prediction is not the purpose of 
the study, but rather an explanation of the variability of the disclosure scores is sought”. However, 
multivariate analysis allows for an examination of the relationship between the dependent variable 
(transformed compliance score in this case) and “each of the corporate characteristics (independent 
variables), while simultaneously controlling for the effects of other independent variables in the model” 
(Vlachos, 2001: 190). Thus, the best fir for the data may not be of a major concern (Al-Shiab, 2003).  
     One of the main assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that there is no 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. In this study, multicollinearity was checked with a 
variance inflation factor (VIF)>10 as a threshold (Gujarati, 2003: 262) and the VIF values are reported for 
each regression. Additionally, in order to address the concerns relating to heteroskedasticity, the present 
study employs “Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 3 (HC3)”. This alternative 
method tends to produce better results than White’s (1980) basic method because it produces confidence 
intervals which tend to be even more conservative (MacKinnon and White, 1985). Heteroscedasticity can 
arise as a result of the presence of outliers (Gujarati, 2003: 390). This issue is also considered in the 
present study and outliers are defined and excluded by using Cook’s Distance as a measure (Fielding and 
Gilbert, 2004; Pallant, 2005). These two approaches control for a further important assumption of the 
classical linear regression that of homoscedasticity. 
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4. Main findings 
     The findings regarding the extent to which Greek companies complied with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures in 2005 are presented in Table 6. Additionally, the compliance scores under both the PC 
method and Cooke’s approach are shown separately.  
 
TABLE 6 – ABOUT HERE 
 
Arguably, a relative degree of non-compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements might have been 
expected in countries with substantially different financial reporting regimes compared to IFRS, during 
the first year of IFRS implementation. However, the findings in Table 6 illustrate a relatively low average 
level of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures in 2005 by Greek listed companies. This 
approximates to 80% (actual levels depend on the method employed for measuring compliance). Table 6 
also indicates that there is considerable variation in the compliance scores identified: standard deviations 
are 10% or 8%, depending on the method employed for measuring compliance. Additionally, only 20% 
(approximately) of the companies examined complied at a level higher than 90%.  
     These findings are consistent with evidence suggesting low enforcement mechanisms in Greece in 
general and, in particular, the lenient approach taken by the regulator regarding compliance with IFRS 
during the first years of their implementation (cf. Avlonitis, 2007; Vroustouris, 2007). They also reflect 
on the tendency of Greek companies not to provide high levels of disclosures (cf. Vlachos, 2001; 
Tsakumis, 2007). Possibly, they also indicate the low familiarity of Greek accountants and auditors 
regarding IFRS requirements.   
     The relatively high non-compliance levels identified confirm the concerns expressed in the literature 
regarding the role that enforcement mechanisms play in the achievement of a successful level of 
comparability across jurisdictions that adopt IFRS (e.g. Ball, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Weetman, 2006; Giner 
and Rees, 2005; Schipper, 2005). In fact, the findings of the present study are in favour of the argument 
raised by Nobes and Parker (2008) that low enforcement mechanisms may result in de facto voluntary 
compliance with IFRS.  
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     Although caution is needed, if one makes the ‘heroic’ assumption that results of studies measuring 
compliance with mandatory disclosures in different countries are comparable, these findings are similar to 
prior studies investigating compliance with mandatory disclosures in emerging capital markets (e.g. Hong 
Kong (Tai et al., (1990); Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994); Spain (Wallace et al. 1994); Czech 
Republic (Patton and Zelenka, 1997); Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 1998)). It is notable that these studies 
refer to samples relating to the late 1980s or early/mid 1990s and in countries where low enforcement has 
been indicated. Additionally, these findings are significantly lower than the results of Vlachos (2001) who 
examined Greek listed companies’ compliance with Greek law requirements 10 years before the period 
covered in the present study. (However, as discussed above, Vlachos’ (2001) results might be biased 
upwards). Thus, these compliance levels do not reflect the compliance levels that would be expected to be 
identified in a developed market (as is ASE) nowadays. 
 
Methodological considerations 
Consistent with the findings of Street and Gray (2001) and Tsalavoutas et al. (2010), it is shown that the 
two methods employed produce significantly different compliance scores. The “paired sample t-test” 
indicates that Cooke’s method produces significantly higher scores than the PC method. Additionally, the 
“Wilcoxon test” indicates that the ranking of companies based on the compliance scores changes 
depending on the method employed.18 Thus, care is needed when one reads the findings of a study 
examining compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements, if only one method has been used.  
     This is further supported when one looks at the frequencies regarding the compliance scores below the 
threshold of 80%. When compliance has been measured with the PC method, approximately 50% of the 
companies belong to this category. However, when the commonly used method is employed, 
approximately 30% of the companies appear in this category. Al-Shiab (2003) implements only the PC 
method and this might be a reason for reporting substantially lower compliance scores compared to 
studies in other emerging markets for a similar period (e.g. Hassan et al. (2006) with reference to Egypt.) 
At the same time, the findings of prior studies using only “Cooke’s method” may report relatively inflated 
scores (depending on the number of items from each accounting standard included in the research 
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instrument). As discussed above, only the study of Street and Gray (2001) uses the two methods 
simultaneously and their findings provide preliminary support for this argument. However, they do not 
test statistically the differences between the scores produced under the two different methods. 
     In line with the approach taken by Tsalavoutas et al. (2010), to illustrate the potential of misleading 
results under Cooke’s method, the corresponding findings are provided in Table 7, after having excluded 
the compliance score with the disclosure requirements of IAS 1. As was indicated previously, IAS 1 
contains the larger number of items required to be disclosed. Additionally, it deals mainly with 
presentational issues and not with measurement and recognition issues. (In fact, the results in the next 
section indicate that the majority of companies tend to comply with its requirements and thus driving the 
overall compliance score upwards).  
 
TABLE 7 – ABOUT HERE 
 
The results in Table 7 are in line with the findings by Tsalavoutas et al. (2010). The average score reduces 
by only 1% for the PC method and median score remains the same. However, the average score for 
Cooke’s method reduces dramatically by 7% and the median by 5%.19 Thus, the results of the two 
methods now become very similar. However, although the absolute difference between the scores 
produced by the two methods is smaller it continues to be significantly different. More specifically, the 
average compliance scores under Cooke’s approach are marginally lower than those of the PC method.  
     Most importantly, the frequencies regarding the companies found under the 80% threshold remain the 
same for the PC method whereas they change dramatically for the scores under Cooke’s approach: from 
being 33.3% previously, they increase to 56.2% after excluding IAS 1. Similar is the case for the 
percentage of companies being in the range between 90-100%. From representing 22% previously, they 
represent only 6.5% after excluding IAS 1, as far as Cooke’s method is concerned. The corresponding 
figure reduces only by 1.3% with reference to the PC method.  
     These findings illustrate how sensitive the scores produced under Cooke’s method might be to the 
number of items mandated by the standards included in the research instrument. Thus, arguably, 
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misleading conclusions about the extent to which companies comply with mandatory disclosures may be 
drawn. Accordingly, these findings strengthen the proposition for researchers to employ both methods 
when conducting this type of research, so as to avoid producing misleading findings. This may also have 
econometric implications regarding the findings relating to the factors explaining compliance. (The 
findings of Street and Gray (2001), as well as those provided below, support this argument.) 
 
Compliance with the disclosure requirements of each standard separately 
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics regarding the compliance scores for each standard separately. 
Compliance scores across standards have been ranked in a descending order on the basis of the average 
score. N indicates the number of companies for which each standard was relevant. The standard deviation 
of compliance scores is also of relevance for the purposes of this study.  
 
TABLE 8 – ABOUT HERE 
 
Some key observations worth discussion. IAS 10 is the standard with the highest average compliance 
score. This is because the majority of companies complied with the relatively straight-forward 
requirement of disclosing “the date when the financial statements were authorised for issue and who gave 
that authorisation” (paragraph 17). However, measuring compliance with this standard may entail high 
subjectivity because it is not always evident if a post-balance sheet event has incurred. Hence, it is not 
always evident whether disclosure is omitted or there is no event to be disclosed.  
     IAS 1 follows with an average compliance score of 95% and this standard exhibits the lowest standard 
deviation (5%). This suggests that most companies have complied with virtually all the standard’s 
requirements. A possible explanation is that it is relatively easy for companies to comply with this 
standard since much of the required information is basic (e.g. name of the entity, description of 
operations, provision of financial statements, and key items to be included in the financial statements). 
Thus, complying with the requirements of this standard does not imply high proprietary costs (Al-
Shammari, 2005).  
26 
 
     A relatively high compliance score is also exhibited by IAS 18 but with a very high standard deviation 
(22%). This reflects the fact that many companies do not disclose “the amount of each significant 
category of revenue recognised during the period” (paragraph 35b). This non-disclosure indicates the 
proprietary costs may exist when disclosing this kind of information. The case of IAS 20 (government 
grants) is also similar. On the one hand, the policy adopted with regard to government grants was 
disclosed. On the other hand, a large proportion of the companies remained silent regarding “the nature 
and extent of government grants recognised in the financial statements and an indication of other forms of 
government assistance from which the entity has directly benefited” (paragraph 39b). 
     Finally, it is observed that standards that introduced new measurement and/or recognition 
requirements compared to Greek GAAP (cf. Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010), exhibit very low average 
levels of compliance. They also exhibit significantly high variability of compliance scores. The case for 
the standards requiring disclosures that involve high proprietary costs is also similar. Some examples 
include the following: IAS 40 (72%, sd: 22%); IFRS 3 (72%, sd: 31%); IAS 14 (71%, sd: 25%); IAS 37 
(70%, sd: 24%); IAS 19 (64%, sd: 27%); IAS 28 (63%, sd: 31%); IAS 17 (51%, sd: 29) ; and IAS 36 
(50%, sd: 35%).  
     The figures in Table 8 also indicate also indicate that there were companies which did not provide any 
of the information required by these standards (i.e. compliance score was zero). 10 companies were silent 
in respect of the disclosures required by IAS 17, five in respect of IAS 36, and five in respect of IAS 19. 
On a more positive note, there were some companies that exhibited full compliance with the requirements 
of those standards. 11 in respect of IAS 17 and 11 in respect of IAS 36 but only one in respect of  IAS 19.  
     It is noteworthy that, although the instances of qualified reports were not few, none of the 
qualifications was referring to non-compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements.  
  
Multivariate analyses  
This section reports the findings of the multivariate analyses for testing H1 & H2. Focusing on the 
findings reported in Table 9, it can be seen that all regression models are significant at 1% level (F 
values). This indicates that the proposed corporate characteristics explain a significant part of the 
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variation of the levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Additionally, it is observed that 
all of the variance inflation factors (VIF) are lower than two,  indicating that there is no concern of 
multicollinearity between the independent variables.20  
     Moreover, it is shown that the regressions where the dependent variable is the compliance scores 
transformed by using the log of the odds ratio, report a high mean square error (MSE). In fact, it is 
substantially higher than that of the regression where the dependent variable has been transformed into 
percentile ranks. Consistent with the prior literature (e.g. Cooke, 1998; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Leventis and Weetman, 2004) and with the criterion set (i.e. minimum MSE), the discussion that follows 
concentrates on the regression models with the percentile ranks as the dependent variable.21 Finally, it is 
highlighted that the analysis regarding the regression referring to the PC method is based on 146 
observations whereas that using Cooke’s method is based on 145 observations. This is because there is an 
additional observation appearing to be influential and has been treated as an outlier with regard to 
Cooke’s method.  
 
TABLE 9 – ABOUT HERE 
 
The adjusted R2 indicates that the corporate characteristics selected for the purposes of this study explain 
at 39% (PC method) or 35% (Cooke’s method) the variation in companies’ levels of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures. The findings of these analyses indicate a significantly positive association (at 1%) 
between type of audit firm and levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures. Additionally, they 
indicate that the difference between 2004 net profit, as reported under Greek GAAP, and the 
corresponding restated figure under IFRS is associated with companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures. A significantly negative association (at 1%) is identified. Furthermore, a 
significantly positive association (at 1% or at 5%) between the difference of 2004 shareholders’ equity, as 
reported under Greek GAAP, and the corresponding restated figure under IFRS and companies’ levels of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures is reported.  
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     Focusing on the coefficients, it is indicative that the highest weighted variable is audit firm type. This 
is followed by the change in 2004 shareholders’ equity and the change in 2004 net profit, as a result of the 
transition to IFRS. 
     On that basis, H1 and H2 are supported. It can be concluded that companies with a “Big 4” auditor, 
exhibited more positive changes in their restated IFRS 2004 net profit figure and exhibited more negative 
changes in their restated IFRS 2004 shareholders’ equity figure, comply most with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures. Reflecting on the development of hypotheses, these are not surprising findings and can be 
interpreted in the following way.   
     Considering prior evidence that companies’ levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures are 
associated with shareholders’ equity (cf. Tai et al., 1990), and in line with what agency theory posits, 
company managers may well be under pressure to “communicate” and explain why their financial 
position appears to be worse under the higher quality accounting standards (i.e. IFRS) which are believed 
to reflect companies’ assets and liabilities more accurately. This would also pre-empt allegation of such a 
significant change being due to fraudulent accounting practices under Greek GAAP. Additionally, such a 
negative impact would indicate poorly managed companies and this, according to the “market discipline” 
perspective, would jeopardise management’s reputation. Hence, higher levels of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures facilitate minimisation of agency costs.   
     Additionally, the finding regarding the change in the 2004 net profit (i.e. that the more positive the 
change the higher the compliance levels) can be interpreted with the propositions of signalling theory. 
Within this framework, it could be suggested that management provides extended levels of compliance to 
communicate that previous year’s performance was low, not because of their inefficiency but because 
Greek GAAP was of poor quality, i.e. the previous accounting regime produced conservative reported 
performance. This meets the objective of signalling that their companies had performed well in terms of 
profitability but the accounting rules did not allow this to be reflected on the financial statements. 
Accordingly, in this way, the managers of these companies try to “screen” their companies from those 
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remaining (i.e. the majority) which faced a negative change. Thus, “non-lemon owners have an incentive 
to communicate” (Spence, 1974: 93) in order to avoid the adverse selection problem.  
     Furthermore, this finding can also be consistent with the propositions of agency theory. Managers may 
well be under pressure to “communicate” the reasons for such an improvement in companies’ restated 
profitability. This would pre-empt allegation that such a significant change is due to fraudulent 
accounting practices. In particular, reporting substantially improved restated profitability may trigger the 
suspicion of shareholders under the rationale that this improvement is a result of a “transitional big bath” 
leading to misleading perceptions about companies’ profitability levels and, potentially, good future 
prospects (Inchausti, 1997). Hence, higher disclosures facilitate the minimisation of agency costs in this 
respect.  
     Finally, in line with the premises of political costs theory, a positive change could well be interpreted 
as companies intentionally reporting lower profits under Greek GAAP so as not to attract the public eye. 
Accordingly, companies whose restated profitability was affected significantly positively might be more 
concerned that this change may trigger political action with reference to past performance. Thus, higher 
compliance levels may reflect management’s efforts to minimise political action.  
     The positive association between audit firm size and the extent to which Greek companies comply 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures is consistent with the prior literature pertinent to this study (e.g. Tai et 
al., 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Street and 
Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003). Several inferences can be drawn from this finding. First, these 
results confirm the preliminary evidence shown by Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010) regarding the instances 
of non-compliance with IFRS 1, i.e. no provision of reconciliation statements, and the relationship with 
audit firm size. Second, these findings are in line with the proposition that large and international audit 
companies may have greater competence and expertise on IFRS (cf. Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). 
In fact, according to Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), “Big 4” audit companies could attract experienced 
employees from their foreign operations to assist in the transition process in Greece. Additionally, greater 
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audit effort by large audit firms is well documented in Greece. Hence, this expertise and competence 
could justify the higher levels of compliance identified.  
     As far as theoretical considerations are concerned, these findings indicate strong evidence of the 
applicability of agency and signalling theories with regard to Greek listed companies’ compliance with 
IFRS mandatory disclosures. In particular, higher earnings management as well as lower audit effort are 
well documented in Greece for companies with small audit firms. Thus, employing a “Big 4” audit firm 
acts as a monitoring mechanism and satisfies the need for transparency and better quality financial 
statements. This leads to a reduction of agency costs. 
     Additionally, considering this context in Greece, managers may also intentionally employ a “Big 4” 
firm as a signal of high accounting quality. This would allow them to “screen” their companies from 
those employing small audit firms which are associated with higher earnings management as well as 
lower audit effort. At the same time, employing a “Big 4” auditor would indeed result in higher 
compliance with mandatory disclosures (see discussion above). In fact, Hodgdon et al. (2009) illustrate in 
a multi-country study that compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures is positively associated with 
auditor choice.  
 
Methodological considerations 
The results in Table 9 confirm the findings by Street and Gray (2001) and the corresponding expectations 
regarding the different significant associations between corporate characteristics and compliance levels, 
because of the use of different methods for measuring compliance. Use of the PC method only, would 
have reported that industry type is also a factor associated with the extent to which companies comply 
with IFRS mandatory disclosures. In contrast, this would not have been the case if Cooke’s method had 
followed only.  
     One could argue that these differences, may be attributed to the fact that one additional observation is 
included in the tests with reference to compliance scores being measured by using the PC method. To 
explore if this is the case, the previous analyses have been repeated by excluding this observation. The 
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results (not tabulated) indicate that although the size of the coefficients change slightly the overall 
findings do not change. Industry type continues to be significantly negatively associated with the extent 
of companies’ compliance under the PC method. However, it remains insignificant under Cooke’s 
method. These results allow for the conclusion that the influential observation does not affect the overall 
findings, i.e. the fact that different corporate characteristics appear to be significant having followed a 
different method for measuring compliance.  
     To be consistent with the previous discussion, further explorations have been carried out by excluding 
IAS 1. The corresponding findings are presented in Table 10 and refer to the same companies that the 
main findings refer to (i.e. Table 9). 
     It is shown that the results do not change when IAS 1 is excluded. Industry type continues to be 
significant under the PC method but insignificant under Cooke’s method. Accordingly, although 
excluding the “influential” standard (i.e. IAS 1) leads to more similar scores between the two methods 
(see Table 7) the corporate characteristics associated with compliance levels differ when the two methods 
employed simultaneously. 
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Considering all multivariate analyses, a significant association between non-manufacturing companies 
and the extent to which Greek companies comply with IFRS mandatory disclosures it is shown when the 
scores have been measured by using only the PC method.22  
     Accordingly, it is concluded that there is no clear evidence that industry type is associated with 
companies’ levels of mandatory disclosures. Neither the finding with reference to the PC method nor the 
corresponding one with regard to Cooke’s method are considered as robust for making generalisations 
and drawing conclusions. 
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5 Conclusions 
     The present study builds on and contributes to literature examining compliance with national 
accounting standards and/or IAS/IFRS. It contributes to this literature in the following three ways. First, 
it adds a large scale academic study examining compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosures after 
2005 in the EU. Second, it provides evidence regarding the implications of the use of different methods 
for measuring compliance with mandatory disclosures. Third, it provides evidence regarding the 
explanatory factors of compliance levels with IFRS mandatory disclosures, during the first year of IFRS 
implementation.  
     The findings of the present study illustrate a relatively low average level of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosures in 2005 by Greek listed companies. This approximates to 80% (actual levels 
depend on the method employed for measuring compliance). It is also indicative that there is considerable 
variation in the compliance scores identified: standard deviations are 10% or 8%, depending on the 
method employed for measuring compliance. These compliance levels, which may be considered low for 
a developed market, reflect on the lenient approach of the regulator regarding compliance with IFRS 
during the initial period of their implementation. 
     Further analyses, on a standard by standard basis, indicate that standards that introduced new 
measurement and/or recognition requirements compared to Greek GAAP, exhibit very low average levels 
of compliance. They also exhibit significantly high variability of compliance scores. Similar is the case 
for the standards require disclosures that involve high proprietary costs. Additionally, there were 
instances where companies did not provide any of the information required by specific standards. 
     Overall, the relatively high non-compliance levels identified confirm the concerns expressed in the 
literature regarding the role that enforcement mechanisms play in the achievement of a successful level of 
comparability across jurisdictions that adopt IFRS (e.g. Ball, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Weetman, 2006; Giner 
and Rees, 2005; Schipper, 2005). In fact, the findings of the present study are in favour of the argument 
raised by Nobes and Parker (2008: 195) that “weak legislation, lack of resources and ineffective audit 
profession in some EU countries make compliance with IFRS in practice voluntary”. 
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     Further, the present study provides strong evidence that companies having the following 
characteristics comply most with IFRS mandatory disclosures in 2005: those having a “Big 4” auditor; 
those exhibited more positive changes in their restated IFRS 2004 net profit figure; and those exhibited 
more negative changes in their restated IFRS 2004 shareholders’ equity figure. 
     With regard to the two restated measures, as discussed above, there have been consistent findings of 
earnings management by Greek listed companies. The areas of creative accounting practices followed 
under Greek GAAP were expected to be curtailed with the introduction of IFRS. Accordingly, the latter 
was expected to cause a significant impact on companies’ financial statements. The findings by 
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010); HCMC (2006) and Grant Thornton (2006) indicate that implementation of 
IFRS inter alia did indeed have a significant impact on the financial reported position and performance of 
Greek listed companies. In many instances this significant impact appears to be material. On that basis, 
the findings of the present study indicate that such a significant change, in companies’ restated measures, 
has acted as a driving factor for companies’ compliance with IFRS overall mandatory disclosure 
requirements in 2005. Hence, the results of this study indicate that the compliance risks that managers 
bear are heavily dependent on the impact caused on their companies’ financial position and performance, 
as a result of the adoption of IFRS. Additionally, propositions of agency and signalling theories provide 
the basis for interpreting these findings.  
     As far as audit firm size is concerned, considering the particular context of Greece, these findings are 
consistent with prior evidence that higher earnings management as well as lower audit effort are well 
documented for companies with small auditors. Thus, employing a “Big 4” audit firm acts as a 
monitoring mechanism and satisfies the need for transparency and better quality financial statements. 
This leads to a reduction of agency costs and results in higher levels of compliance.  
     Finally, from a methodological point of view, the findings of this study provide strong evidence that 
using only one method for measuring compliance with mandatory disclosures may produce misleading 
perception about the extent to which companies comply with the standards’ requirements. Beyond this, 
using only one method may also have implications with regard to the explanatory factors that appear to be 
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significantly associated with the levels of compliance identified. Accordingly, this study suggests 
simultaneous use of both the commonly used dichotomous approach and the PC method as they were 
employed in this study.  
     Accordingly, the findings of this research should be of particular interest to researchers aiming to 
conduct studies on compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. They should also be of 
particular interest to practitioners reading studies reporting compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure 
requirements. 
     A major strength of the study is that the results are time specific, i.e. focusing on the first year of 
mandatory implementation of IFRS. However, this might also present a limitation. It may give a 
misleading perception about companies’ compliance behaviour. Prior research indicates that companies’ 
disclosures increase overtime (e.g. Hassan et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2008). Thus, the relatively low levels 
of disclosures identified might be an outcome of preparers’ low familiarity with the disclosure 
requirements of the new standards. Consequently compliance levels may improve in the future.  
     Additionally, the findings of the present research suggest that the impacts reported in companies’ 
reconciliation statements with regard to shareholders’ equity and net income are associated with 
compliance levels in 2005. However, in the years to follow companies will not have to produce 
reconciliation statements and thus these explanatory factors will not be testable. As a result, future 
research could explore what are the most important determinants of compliance with IFRS mandatory 
disclosures after 2005.
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NOTES 
1
 The exception is the study of Tai et al. (1990) which uses an index provided by an audit firm. 
2
 An indication of the potential impact of the structure of the research instrument and different sample 
is provided if one examines the findings of Ali et al. (2004) and Akhtaruddin (2005). The latter focuses 
explicitly on Bangladesh and examines the extent of mandatory disclosures by 94 listed companies in 
1999. Ali et al. (2004) inter alia examine a sample of 118 companies from Bangladesh with reference to 
1998. Akhtaruddin’s (2005) research instrument includes fewer items than that of Ali et al. (2004) and he 
finds substantially lower levels of compliance. More specifically, he finds that, on average, companies 
disclose 44% of the items of information mandated by the accounting standards whilst Ali et al. (2004) 
report a compliance score of 78%. This example illustrates that researchers need to be cautious when 
making comparisons of findings of studies having implemented different research design. 
3
 By Greek GAAP is meant codified accounting rules, in particular Law 2190/20 and Presidential 
Decree (PD) 186/92 (Tax Law-known also as Code of Books and Records) and pronouncements of the 
Committee of Accounting Standardisation and Auditing (ELTE). This is a narrow definition of GAAP. 
The term ‘GAAP’ in other jurisdictions may refer also to professional pronouncement or non-
promulgated guidance or practices (cf. Evans, 2004). 
4The argument about caution needed when comparing findings of such studies also applies here. 
5
 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ifrs_staffobservations.htm (last accessed on 8 June 2009) 
6
 Tower et al. (1999) is the only other study employing two methods for measuring compliance with 
IAS mandatory disclosures. They follow a similar approach to that of Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
discussed above. 
7
 Daske et al. (2007) indicate that there were very few Greek listed companies that had adopted 
IAS/IFRS prior to 2005 on a voluntary basis. 
8
 The results of this study have also been published in 2002: Street and Gray (2002). 
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9
 These standards represented the IASB’s ‘stable platform’ and were the standards required to be 
implemented in 2005. The six standards excluded are: IAS 26 ‘Accounting and Reporting by Retirement 
Benefit Plans’; IAS 29 ‘Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies’; IAS 30 ‘Disclosures in the 
Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions’; IAS 34 ‘Interim Financial Reporting’; 
and IFRS 4 ‘Insurance Contracts’. These standards are not relevant for the purposes of this study because 
they do not apply to the Greek sample companies. IAS 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement’ is also excluded as it covers only the recognition and measurement aspects of financial 
instruments; disclosure and presentation are covered by IAS 32 (which is included in the research 
instrument). 
10
 The ‘Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu IFRS Presentation and disclosure checklist 2005’ and the 
corresponding PricewaterhouseCoopers checklist were also consulted in this process. However, neither 
was adopted because they had been structured according to categories (e.g. disclosures related to the 
balance sheet).  
11
 Content validity indicates whether the instrument ‘adequately measures the concept of interest’ 
(Vlachos, 2001, 184 with reference to Sekaran, 1992) (i.e., in this case, compliance with disclosure 
requirements). It is usually established when the items which are supposed to measure the concept are 
evaluated by a group of expert judges to ensure that they in fact do so (Kidder & Judd, 1986). This is a 
common approach in the literature (e.g. Camfferman & Cooke (2002), Al-Shiab (2003), Vlachos (2001) 
and Cooke (1992)). 
12
 The first independent researcher is a Professor of Accounting and a Chartered Accountant. The 
second independent researcher is a senior financial accounting and reporting analyst, with more than 12 
years experience in the field. Prior to this he was employed in the banking industry for more than 20 
years.  
13
 Reliability is concerned with the accuracy of measurement, i.e. how well the concept under 
investigation is being measured (Vlachos, 2001 with reference to Sekaran, 1992), and the precision, 
stability and consistency of measurement. Stability refers to the ability of the instrument to measure the 
concept of interest consistently, independent of timing and conditions. The main threat to reliability 
derives from the subjective judgment exercised in completing the research instrument (Vlachos, 2001). 
14
 The results are available on request. Only four of those companies are included in the final sample. 
15
 It is acknowledged that there is vast literature regarding the corporate characteristics related to 
companies’ voluntary levels of disclosures. However, the references here focus on studies examining the 
explanatory factors of compliance with mandatory disclosures as they are more relevant to the purposes 
of the present study. 
16
 This is not a non-parametric percentile ranks regression (e.g. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
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Leventis and Weetman, 2004a; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). (The independent variables have not been 
transformed into to ranks. As discussed above, their transformation is based on their square root. This 
avoids the use of non-parametric regression which produces less powerful results (cf. Leventis, 2001)). 
Only each company’s compliance score is transformed into percentile ranks. This transformation of the 
dependent variable effectively measures the relative levels of disclosure of the companies within the 
sample (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). It also allows for the comparison of the results with those of the 
OLS regression using the log of the odds ratio as a dependent variable. 
17
 Two more types of OLS regressions have also been conducted: one with using the actual 
(untransformed) compliance score as the dependent variable (e.g. Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Ali et al., 2004; Glaum and Street, 
2003; Tower et al., 1999); and one which uses the natural logarithm of the compliance score as the 
dependent variable (i.e. a log-lin model, cf. Hodgdon et al. (2009) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007)). The 
results are similar to those identified by the two main techniques presented herein so their presentation is 
suppressed for reasons of economy. 
18
 I am grateful to Vivien Beattie for pointing this out. 
19
 Wilcoxon signed rank tests and Paired sample t-tests were conducted and illustrated that these 
changes (decreases) are significant at 1%. 
20
 A Pearson correlation matrix (not tabulated) also indicates that there is no concern of collinearity 
between the independent variables employed in these analyses. No association higher than 0.5 exists. 
21
 It is noted that the regressions with the log of the odds ratio as the dependent variable tend to report 
very similar results. 
22
 In fact, this variable appears to have larger weight in the multivariate analyses (as indicated by the 
size of the coefficients) from the earnings comparability index.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Prior research on compliance with national standards’ mandatory disclosures. 
Authors Country Year Sample Research instrument No. of disclosure index 
methods employed Findings 
Tai et al. (1990) Hong Kong 1986 76 
Disclosure checklist 
provided by a (then) 
‘Big 8’ audit firm 
1 
Average compliance: 78%. Very low 
compliance levels regarding specific 
areas (e.g. 49% in relation to 
depreciation) 
Cooke (1992) Japan 1988 35 Self-constructed index 1 Average compliance: 95%. Standard deviation: 3%. 
Solas (1994) Jordan 1988 45 Self-constructed index 1 Average compliance: 46.35%. Standard deviation: 1%. 
Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1994) Bangladesh 1988 63 Self-constructed index 1 
Only four companies exhibit 
compliance above 90%. 37 companies 
are to be found in the range of 60-80%. 
Abayo et al. 
(1993) Tanzania 1990 51 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 53%. Range 
between 31% and 72%. 
Wallace and 
Naser (1995) Hong Kong 1991 80 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 73%. Range 
between 55% and 87% 
Wallace et al. 
(1994) Spain 1991 50 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 59%. Range 
between 29% and 80%. 
Naser and 
Nuseibeh (2003)  Saudi-Arabia 
1992 
& 
1999 
67 Self-constructed index 2 
In contrast to other studies, they inter 
alia report a high degree of compliance 
(average: 89%). 
Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh (2005) New Zealand 
1992 
1993 
1996 
1997 
50 Self-constructed index 1 
Compliance levels increased throughout 
this period from an average of 78% in 
1992 to an average of 88% in 1997. The 
standard deviation of the scores has 
dropped as well (from 4.3% 1992 to 
2.87% in 1997). 
Patton and 
Zelenka (1997) Czech Republic 1993 50 Self-constructed index 3 
They report large variability in the 
compliance scores: from 25% to 80%. 
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Table 1 (continued): Prior research on compliance with national standards’ mandatory disclosures. 
Authors Country Year Sample Research instrument No. of disclosure index 
methods employed Findings 
Craig and Diga 
(1998) 
Singapore, 
Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the 
Philippines & 
Thailand 
1993 145 Self-constructed index 1 Relatively low mean levels of disclosures, ranged from 51% - 61%. 
Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) Zimbabwe 1994 49 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 74%. Relatively 
small standard deviation (5%). 
Vlachos (2001) Greece Cyprus 1996 
74 
50 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 89% Small 
standard deviation of 2.3%. (With 
reference to the 74 Greek companies) 
Ali et al. (2004) India, Pakistan & Bangladesh 1998 566 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance approximately 
80% for each country. Relatively large 
average standard deviation of 8% 
Akhtaruddin 
(2005) Bangladesh 1999 94 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 44% Small 
standard deviation (1.2%). 
Aljifri (2008) United Arab Emirates 2003 31 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 67% Small 
standard deviation (11%). 
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Table 2: Prior research on compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
Authors Country Year Sample Research Instrument No. of disclosure index 
methods employed Findings 
Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman, 
(2007) 
Egypt 
1991/
1992 
1995/
1996 
72 (only 
20 for 
1991/ 
1992) 
Self-constructed index 1 
Compliance of 76% in the first period with 
a standard deviation of 5%. Compliance 
increase in the second period (84%) but 
standard deviation also increases (7%). 
Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman, 
(2003)  
Egypt 1995/1996 72 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance: 83%. This was 73% 
when referring to the newly introduced 
disclosure items. It was even lower (36%) 
when referring to items which hadn’t been 
translated to the Arabic language. 
Hassan et al. 
(2006) Egypt 
1995-
2002 77 Self-constructed index 1 
Average compliance score for the entire 
period: 90%. 
Al-Shiab 
(2003) Jordan 
1995-
2000 50 Self-constructed index 1 
Companies’ level of compliance ranged 
between 45% and 56%.  
Street et al. 
(1999) 
12 Different 
countries 1996 49 Self-constructed index 1 
20 companies complied in full. For the 
remaining companies, compliance with 
individual standards was relatively low. 
Al-Shammari 
et al. (2008) 
Bahrain, Oman 
and Kuwait 
1996 - 
2002 137 Self-constructed index 1 
Compliance increased over time, from 
68% in 1996 to 82% in 2002. Significant 
variation of compliance levels across 
different countries is reported. 
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Table 2 (Continued): Prior research on compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
Authors Country Year Sample Research instrument 
No. of disclosure index 
methods employed Findings 
Tower et al. 
(1999) 
Australia, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore and 
Thailand 
1997 60  Self-constructed index 2 
Average compliance: 91%. Standard deviation: 
4%. 
Street and 
Bryant (2000) 
17 Different 
countries 1998 82 
Self-constructed 
index 1 
The results indicate that the overall level of 
compliance was less than 75%. Large variability in 
the compliance levels is also identified in this 
study with companies exhibiting low levels of 
compliance with several individual standards. 
Street and 
Gray (2001) 
32 Different 
countries 1998 279 
Self-constructed 
index 2 
Companies’ level of compliance ranged from 60% 
to 93%. 
Peng et al. 
(2008) China 
1999 
& 
2002 
79 Self-constructed index 1 
Companies exhibit a relatively high compliance 
with the items mandated by Chinese GAAP (97% 
for both years). The compliance with IAS 
requirements improves from 86% in 1999 to 90% 
in 2002. 
Sucher and 
Alexander 
(2002) 
Czech Republic 1999 22 
KPMG IAS 
disclosure 
checklist 
Survey 
A significant degree of non-compliance is 
reported. None of the companies fully complied 
with the five standards under review. 
Cairns (2001) 
29 Different 
countries 
(mainly in EU) 
1999-
2000 165 Survey Survey 
The study reveals that only 62% of the companies 
examined fully complied with the IAS. 
Glaum and 
Street (2003) Germany 2000 
100 IAS 
100 US 
GAAP 
Ernst & Young 
disclosure 
checklist 
1 
Levels of compliance with IAS ranged from 41.6% 
to 100%, with an average of 81%. This was 
significantly lower compared to the compliance 
with US GAAP (87%). 
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Table 2 (Continued): Prior research on compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
Authors Country Year Sample Research instrument No. of disclosure index 
methods employed Findings 
Gebhardt and 
Heilmann 
(2004) 
Germany 2000 
59 (with 
reference 
to IAS) 
Self-constructed 
index 1 Compliance was particularly low for IAS 7. 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Committee 
(SEC) 
(2006) 
Different 
countries 2005 100 Survey Survey 
With regard to disclosures in particular, some of 
the areas identified include the following: revenue 
recognition, goodwill and intangible assets, 
financial instruments, leases and contingent 
liabilities. 
ICAEW 
(2006), on 
behalf of the 
European 
Commission 
Different 
European 
countries 
2005 200 Survey Survey 
This survey inter alia identifies some compliance 
issues regarding disclosures relating to: business 
combinations, goodwill and impairment testing. 
Fekete et al. 
(2008) Hungary 2006 17 
Self-constructed 
index 1 
Average compliance: 62%. 5 companies exhibiting 
compliance levels lower than 50% and 2 exhibiting 
full compliance. 
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Table 3: Ensuring the validity of the research instrument: Items identified by  
each researcher and in the final index. 
 Items 
suggested by 
the author 
Items suggested 
by an 
independent 
researcher 
Items suggested by 
a second 
independent 
researcher 
Final index  
(after a 4th person’s 
advice) 
IAS 1 74 76 72 72 
IAS 2 9 8 8 8 
IAS 7 10 10 10 10 
IAS 8 6 21 8 16 
IAS 10 5 4 4 4 
IAS 11 9 8 8 8 
IAS 12 14 11 11 11 
IAS 14 26 25 21 20 
IAS 16 17 15 15 15 
IAS 17 23 19 19 19 
IAS 18 4 3 3 3 
IAS 19 23 23 23 23 
IAS 20 3 3 3 3 
IAS 21 9 8 8 8 
IAS 23 3 3 3 3 
IAS 24 18 17 17 17 
IAS 27 11 11 11 11 
IAS 28 13 11 13 13 
IAS 31 7 8 8 8 
IAS 32 31 31 31 31 
IAS 33 8 8 7 7 
IAS 36 38 38 39 39 
IAS 37 17 15 15 15 
IAS 38 18 16 14 14 
IAS 40 19 19 20 21 
IAS 41 23 23 23 23 
IFRS 1 17 14 14 14 
IFRS 2 15 12 12 12 
IFRS 3 25 20 20 20 
IFRS 5 11 10 10 10 
IFRS 6 3 3 3 3 
Total 509 493 473 481 
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Table 4: Summary of the determinants of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
tested in this study.  
Variable Measurement Expected Sign 
Structure-related   
Size Market value + 
- 
Gearing Total debt to total assets + 
- 
Change in the 2004 
shareholders’ equity 
figure as a result of 
the adoption of IFRS,  
Gray’s comparability index with regard to 2004 
shareholders’ equity (EquCoI) 
+ 
- 
Performance-related   
Profitability Pre-tax profit to net sales (ROS) + 
- 
Change in the 2004 
net profit figure as a 
result of the adoption 
of IFRS 
Gray’s comparability index with regard to 2004  
net profit (EarCoI) 
+ 
- 
Liquidity Current assets to current liabilities + 
- 
Market-related   
Audit firm size Dummy variable: 1 if the audit firm is a ‘Big 4’, 0 
otherwise + 
Industry Dummy variable: 1 if a company is manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
+ 
- 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the structure-related variables employed. 
Statistics *Market 
capitalisation  Gearing  
‡EquCoI ROS  ‡EarCoI Liquidity  
Mean 274 0.29 1.11 0.04 1.29 2.13 
SD 934 0.17 0.74 0.17 3.81 5.17 
Min. 2 0 0.35 -0.97 -20.60 0.15 
Max. 10,016 0.68 8.86 0.66 32.05 61.43 
Median 46 0.29 0.99 0.05 0.96 1.40 
Skewness 8.191 -0.025 8.180 -2.228 3.629 10.416 
Kurtosis 79,584 -0.589 84.465 12.975 42.103 116.883 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirmov (Sig) 0.000 0.200* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Normality 
rejected Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
*€ millions. €1=US$1.2597 and €1=£0.6930 (28/4/06-FT). ‡It is noted that a value larger than 1.0 
implies that the measure examined (e.g. shareholders’ equity) is higher under Greek GAAP than under 
IFRS. This indicates a negative impact as a result of the adoption of IFRS. Similarly, a value lower than 
1.0 implies that the measure examined is lower under Greek GAAP than under IFRS, implying a 
positive impact.  
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Table 6: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores (N=153). 
Compliance Score PC method Cooke’s method 
50 - 59 6 3.9% 0 0.0% 
60 - 69 18 11.8% 8 5.3% 
70 - 79 56 36.6% 42 28.0% 
80 - 89 46 30.1% 70 46.7% 
90 - 100 27 17.6% 33 22.0% 
N 153 100.0% 153 100.0% 
Mean 0.79  0.83  
SD 0.10  0.08  
†Paired sample t-test -12.267*** 
Min 0.50  0.62  
Max 0.95  0.97  
Skewness -0.43  -0.51  
Kurtosis -0.51  -0.49  
Kolmogorov 0.013  0.001  
Normality rejected Yes  Yes  
Median 0.78  0.83  
‡Wilcoxon -9.416*** 
†Compares the mean differences across the compliance scores measured by the two different 
methods. ‡Compares the median differences across the compliance scores measured by the two 
different methods. 
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Table 7: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores, excluding IAS 1 (N=153). 
Compliance Score PC method Cooke’s method 
40-49 1 0.7% 1 0.7% 
50 - 59 9 5.9% 12 7.8% 
60 - 69 24 15.7% 30 19.6% 
70 - 79 48 31.4% 43 28.1% 
80 - 89 46 30.1% 57 37.3% 
90 - 100 25 16.3% 10 6.5% 
N 153 100.0% 153 100% 
Mean 0.78  0.76  
SD 0.10  0.11  
†Paired sample t-test 5.644*** 
Min 0.48  0.46  
Max 0.94  0.95  
Skewness -0.45  -0.50  
Kurtosis -0.49  -0.46  
Kolmogorov 0.013  0.081  
Normality rejected Yes  Yes  
Median 0.78  0.78  
‡Wilcoxon -5.659*** 
†It compares the mean differences across the compliance scores measured by the two different 
methods. ‡It compares the median differences across the compliance scores measured by the 
two different methods. 
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Table 8: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores for each standard separately. 
Standards  N Mean SD Minimum Maximum Median 
IAS 10 153 0.96 0.13 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 1 153 0.95 0.05 0.69 1 0.96 
IAS 33 153 0.92 0.22 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 16 152 0.92 0.11 0.55 1 1.00 
IFRS 2 12 0.90 0.26 0.14 1 1.00 
IAS 7 153 0.90 0.16 0.44 1 1.00 
IAS 18 153 0.89 0.22 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 38 133 0.89 0.18 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 27 120 0.88 0.21 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 2 153 0.87 0.20 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 20 106 0.86 0.24 0.00 1 1.00 
IFRS 1 153 0.86 0.13 0.40 1 0.80 
IAS 11 16 0.81 0.24 0.25 1 0.88 
IAS 32 150 0.80 0.19 0.25 1 0.83 
IAS 24 153 0.77 0.25 0.00 1 0.80 
IAS 12 153 0.74 0.18 0.17 1 0.83 
IAS 41 11 0.73 0.22 0.25 1 0.70 
IAS 23 149 0.73 0.44 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 40 40 0.72 0.22 0.17 1 0.73 
IFRS 3 49 0.72 0.31 0.00 1 0.80 
IAS 21 115 0.71 0.42 0.00 1 1.00 
IAS 14 95 0.71 0.25 0.00 1 0.75 
IAS 37 106 0.70 0.24 0.13 1 0.71 
IAS 31 18 0.64 0.27 0.20 1 0.67 
IAS 19 152 0.64 0.27 0.00 1 0.78 
IAS 28 71 0.63 0.31 0.00 1 0.67 
IFRS 5 13 0.61 0.40 0.00 1 0.67 
IAS 17 93 0.51 0.29 0.00 1 0.50 
IAS 8 153 0.51 0.43 0.00 1 0.60 
IAS 36 52 0.50 0.35 0.00 1 0.50 
IFRS 6 1 0.50 - 0.50 0.5 0.50 
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Table 9: Multivariate analyses: associations between corporate characteristics and levels of 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. 
Variables 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Percentile 
Ranks VIF 
Log of the 
Odds VIF 
Percentile 
Ranks VIF 
Log of the 
Odds VIF 
Intercept 0.202  0.935*  0.383  1.752***  
Size 0.006 1.51 0.004 1.50 -0.005 1.53 -0.023 1.51 
Gearing -0.088 1.30 -0.131 1.28 -0.090 1.30 -0.082 1.27 
EquCo_I 0.165*** 1.20 0.331*** 1.18 0.114** 1.18 0.150* 1.18 
Profitability -0.127 1.44 -0.068 1.41 0.135 1.47 0.250 1.41 
Ear_Co_I -0.022*** 1.18 -0.049*** 1.18 -0.018*** 1.09 -0.032*** 1.18 
Liquidity 0.006 1.22 0.008 1.21 0.026 1.20 0.018* 1.21 
Auditor 0.392*** 1.35 0.920*** 1.36 0.407*** 1.03 0.821*** 1.36 
Industry -0.087** 1.02 -0.191** 1.03 -0.059 1.02 -0.090 1.02 
F 20.82***  20.42***  18.43***  16.96***  
Adj. R2 0.39  0.41  0.35  0.36  
MSE  0.050  0.239  0.054  0.203  
N 146  145  145  144  
       *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
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Table 10: Multivariate analyses: associations between corporate characteristics and levels 
of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures, excluding IAS 1. 
Variables 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Percentile 
Ranks VIF 
Log of 
the Odds VIF 
Percentile 
Ranks VIF 
Log of 
the Odds VIF 
Intercept 0.175  0.841  0.194  0.954*  
Size 0.008 1.51 0.006 1.50 0.006 1.53 -0.002 1.51 
Gearing -0.090 1.30 -0.129 1.28 -0.102 1.30 -0.078 1.27 
EquCo_I 0.171*** 1.20 0.343*** 1.18 0.129*** 1.18 0.206** 1.18 
Profitability -0.143 1.44 -0.082 1.41 0.064 1.47 0.107 1.41 
Ear_Co_I -0.022*** 1.18 -0.050*** 1.18 -0.017*** 1.09 -0.034*** 1.18 
Liquidity 0.005 1.22 0.006 1.21 0.015 1.20 -0.004 1.21 
Auditor 0.389*** 1.35 0.926*** 1.36 0.408*** 1.03 0.886*** 1.36 
Industry -0.090** 1.02 -0.196** 1.03 -0.062 1.02 -0.106 1.02 
F 21.18***  20.32***  18.80***  17.56***  
Adj. R2 0.40  0.42  0.38  0.40  
MSE  0.050  0.244  0.051  0.216  
N 146  145  145  144  
       *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
